In his seminal work on scientific revolutions, Thomas Kuhn (1962) defines scientific paradigms as “some accepted examples of actual scientific practice… [that provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific re search.” The purpose of this paper is to investigate the paradigms of computer science and to expose their philosophical origins. Peter Wegner (1976) examines three definitions of computer science: as a branch of mathematics (e.g. Knuth 1968), as an engineering (‘technological’) discipline, and as a natural (‘empirical’) science. He concludes that the practices of computer scientists are effectively committed not to one but to either one of three ‘research paradigms’ ( 1 ). Taking a historical perspective, Wegner argues that each paradigm dominated a different decade during the 20 th century: the scientific paradigm dominated the 1950s, the mathematical paradigm dominated the 1960s, and the technocratic paradigm dominated the 1970s—the decade in which Wegner wrote his paper. ( 2 ) We take Wegner’s historical account to hold and postulate (§5) that to this day computer science is largely dominated by the tenets of the technocratic paradigm. We shall also go beyond Wegner and explore the philosophical roots of the dispute on the definition of the discipline.

Timothy Colburn (2000, p. 154) suggests that the different definitions of the discipline merely emanate from complementary interpretations (or ‘views’) of the activity of writing computer programs, and therefore they can be reconciled as such.